U.S. and Iran: Strategies and Implications

U.S. Vice President JD Vance, along with President Donald Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the Bürgenstock Resort in Switzerland on June 21, 2026. These talks were part of efforts to progress a peace deal in the Middle East.

Earlier this month, President Trump had halted a military strike against Iran, opting instead to criticize Iran’s leadership as deceitful on Truth Social. The U.S. and Iran have been in a diplomatic impasse, with neither side showing willingness to compromise. Amid these tensions, CNN reported that a senior officer at U.S. Central Command called on military analysts to find “creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran.”

These requests showcase a deeper strategic dilemma. The U.S. holds considerable military, economic, and diplomatic strength, but those advantages are meaningful only if they alter Tehran’s decision-making. Iran has consistently followed a strategy believing patience enhances leverage over changing U.S. administrations and shifting political priorities. This strategy considers visible American political events, such as elections and public opinion, important to U.S. flexibility. Tehran’s belief that these factors will eventually influence U.S. policy has perplexed successive American administrations in converting military power into political resolutions.

The U.S. often measures its pressure through the tools it uses — such as airstrikes and sanctions. Meanwhile, Iran gauges whether time benefits its bargaining strength. Regional players like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states complicate this dynamic. They aim to weaken Iran while avoiding destabilizing conflicts that could impact their economies and domestic stability. Tehran expects the confronting coalition to prioritize stability over constant pressure.

Conventional tools like military pressure, sanctions, and diplomacy remain vital. The true issue is not merely exerting more pressure, but ensuring it shifts an adversary’s expectations. As noted in Thomas Schelling’s “Arms and Influence,” coercion works by altering an adversary’s calculations, not merely by inflicting costs. Thus, the primary question is whether Iran believes delaying negotiations will yield better outcomes than engaging now.

To reevaluate its strategy, Washington should assess if its actions bolster or erode Tehran’s confidence in delaying as a benefit. Historical examples, like the U.S. response to the 1973 oil embargo, illustrate democracy’s ability to adapt and grow stronger. Misjudging American political discourse as a weakness is a common error made by U.S. adversaries. The ultimate success of American strategy lies not merely in the damage done to Iran, but in convincing Tehran that patience no longer serves its interests.

Bradley Martin, the executive director of the Near East Center for Strategic Studies, and Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler, head of the Global Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at Reichman University, emphasize that while military prowess provides chances, true success alters expectations. If Iran continues to believe in the advantage of waiting, Washington risks short-term victories that fall short of strategic goals.